Silent OAuth token theft on Android through a non-Chrome default browser
Summary
A malicious app installed on an Android phone could obtain valid Microsoft 365 authentication tokens for the user, with no login page and no interaction. It worked when the user’s default browser was not Chrome (for example Edge) and was already signed in. Microsoft fixed the authentication flow on October 8, 2025.
Impact
The attacker gains access to the account with the victim’s own privileges: reading, modifying and deleting data in any service the account can reach.
Root cause
The sign-in flow checked for the Chrome user agent on Android, and that check could be bypassed by using another browser. Combined with silent authentication (prompt=none) and a redirect to a local address, the browser’s identity and the redirect target were treated as proof of a legitimate user interaction. This is a design assumption, not an implementation slip.
Attack path (simplified)
- The victim installs a malicious app (sideloaded or disguised as a legitimate one).
- The app starts a Microsoft sign-in request using a first-party client that accepts a local redirect, in silent mode.
- It routes the request through the browser that is already signed in.
- The browser silently redirects to the local address with an authorization code.
- The app captures the code and sends it to the attacker.
Lessons for teams building authentication flows
- Do not follow redirects to untrusted or non-HTTPS destinations without explicit user interaction.
- Require user interaction for redirects to localhost; do not allow silent authentication there.
- Treat redirect URI validation as a critical control: the tokens depend on it.
Timeline
- Early 2025: reported to MSRC. Initially classified out of scope, then reopened after a second review.
- October 8, 2025: fix confirmed and deployed.
- November 7, 2025: original write-up published.