Silent OAuth token theft on Android through a non-Chrome default browser

Microsoft 365 · Fixed October 8, 2025 · Reported to MSRC · Original write-up: November 7, 2025

Summary

A malicious app installed on an Android phone could obtain valid Microsoft 365 authentication tokens for the user, with no login page and no interaction. It worked when the user’s default browser was not Chrome (for example Edge) and was already signed in. Microsoft fixed the authentication flow on October 8, 2025.

Impact

The attacker gains access to the account with the victim’s own privileges: reading, modifying and deleting data in any service the account can reach.

Root cause

The sign-in flow checked for the Chrome user agent on Android, and that check could be bypassed by using another browser. Combined with silent authentication (prompt=none) and a redirect to a local address, the browser’s identity and the redirect target were treated as proof of a legitimate user interaction. This is a design assumption, not an implementation slip.

Attack path (simplified)

  1. The victim installs a malicious app (sideloaded or disguised as a legitimate one).
  2. The app starts a Microsoft sign-in request using a first-party client that accepts a local redirect, in silent mode.
  3. It routes the request through the browser that is already signed in.
  4. The browser silently redirects to the local address with an authorization code.
  5. The app captures the code and sends it to the attacker.

Lessons for teams building authentication flows

Timeline

Original post (blog)