Local file exfiltration through Power BI’s query engine
Summary
A malicious Power BI file could silently read files on the user’s computer and send their contents out through DNS lookups, bypassing the privacy-level protection meant to stop data from reaching external sources. Microsoft fixed the issue in the November 2025 security update.
Impact
Any file readable by the user, such as an SSH private key, could be exfiltrated simply by getting the user to open the file.
Root cause
The query engine checked a file path, which makes the operating system resolve it (including over the network), before evaluating whether the privacy level allowed it. Filtering a folder listing on a crafted name was enough to trigger that resolution. The fix evaluates the privacy scope of a path before attempting to resolve it.
Attack path (simplified)
- The victim opens a crafted Power BI file.
- A query reads a local file the user can access.
- The content is encoded into a string that is safe to use in a DNS name.
- The query builds a network path that places this string in a host name controlled by the attacker.
- A folder filter makes the engine check that path, and the resulting DNS lookup delivers the data to the attacker’s name server.
Lessons
- Evaluate trust boundaries before any operation that can cause outbound traffic, including name resolution.
- Treat an unauthorized outbound connection as a potential exfiltration channel, not only as a credential leak.
- When a report is dismissed, a concrete demonstration of impact can change the outcome: here a forced-authentication report was closed, and the reworked file-exfiltration report was reopened and rated Important.
Timeline
- First report (forced authentication): not accepted.
- August 20, 2025: new report demonstrating file exfiltration; rejected again on September 8.
- September 9, 2025: case reopened, severity raised to Important.
- November 2025: fixed in the security update.
- February 9, 2026: original write-up published.